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   Attorneys for Plaintiff
   United States of America
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                       UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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                                    ) CR No. _
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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                                    ) PLEA AGREEMENT FOR DEFENDANT
                    Plaintiff,
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                                      PETER TAOY
                  v.
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    PETER TAOY,
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                    Defendant.
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             This constitutes the plea agreement between PETER TAOY
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    ("defendant") and the United States Attorney's Office for the
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   Central District of California and the Department of Justice,
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   Civil Rights Division (hereinafter collectively referred to "the
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   USAO") in the above-captioned case. This agreement is limited to
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   the USAO and cannot bind any other federal, state or local
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   prosecuting, administrative or regulatory authorities.
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2. Defendant gives up the right to indictment by a grand jury and agrees to plead guilty to a two-count information in the form attached to this agreement or a substantially similar form.

NATURE OF THE OFFENSE

- which charges a violation of Title 18, United States

 Code, Section 241, the following must be true: (a) Defendant

 knowingly and willfully entered into a conspiracy with one or

 more persons to commit the crime charged as the object of the

 conspiracy, (b) The purpose of the conspiracy was to injure,

 oppress, threaten or intimidate any person in any State of the

 United States in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or

 privilege secured to such person by the Constitution or laws of

 the United States, and (c) Defendant willfully conspired to

 deprive Jeffrey Petri of the right to be free from the

 deprivation of liberty without due process of law.
- 4. In order for defendant to be guilty of count two, which charges a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001, the following must be true: (a) Defendant made a false statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the United States government, (b) The defendant acted willfully, that is, deliberately and with knowledge that the statement was untrue, and (c) The statement was material to the activities or decisions of that branch of the United States government.

5. Defendant admits that defendant is, in fact, guilty of these offenses as described in counts one and two of the information.

PENALTIES AND RESTITUTION

- The statutory maximum sentence that the Court can impose 6. for a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 241 is: 10 years imprisonment; a three-year period of supervised release; a fine of \$250,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting from the offense, whichever is greatest; and a mandatory special assessment of \$100. The statutory maximum sentence that the Court can impose for a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001 is: five years imprisonment; a three-year period of supervised release; a fine of \$250,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting from the offense, whichever is greatest; and a mandatory special assessment of \$100. Therefore, the total maximum sentence for all offenses to which defendant is pleading guilty is: 15 years imprisonment; a three-year period of supervised release; a fine of \$500,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting from the offenses, whichever is greatest; and a mandatory special assessment of \$200.
- 7. Supervised release is a period of time following imprisonment during which defendant will be subject to various restrictions and requirements. Defendant understands that if defendant violates one or more of the conditions of any supervised release imposed, defendant may be returned to prison

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for all or part of the term of supervised release, which could result in defendant serving a total term of imprisonment greater that the statutory maximum stated above.

8. Defendant also understands that, by pleading guilty, defendant may be giving up valuable government benefits and valuable civic rights, such as the right to vote, the right to possess a firearm, the right to hold office, and the right to serve on a jury.

- 9. Defendant further understands that the conviction in this case may subject defendant to various collateral consequences, including but not limited to, deportation, revocation of probation, parole, or supervised release in another case, and suspension or revocation of a professional license. Defendant understands that unanticipated collateral consequences will not serve as grounds to withdraw defendant's guilty plea.
- 10. Defendant understands that defendant will be required to pay full restitution to the victim of the offenses. Defendant agrees that, in return for the USAO's compliance with its obligations under this agreement, the amount of restitution is not restricted to the amounts alleged in the counts to which defendant is pleading guilty and may include losses arising from counts dismissed pursuant to this agreement as well as all relevant conduct in connection with those counts. Defendant further agrees that defendant will not seek the discharge of any restitution obligation, in whole or in part, in any present or future bankruptcy proceeding.

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- 11. By pleading guilty, defendant gives up the following rights:
 - a) The right to persist in a plea of not guilty.
 - b) The right to a speedy and public trial by jury.
- c) The right to the assistance of legal counsel at trial, including the right to have the Court appoint counsel for defendant for the purpose of representation at trial. (In this regard, defendant understands that, despite his or her plea of guilty, he or she retains the right to be represented by counsel and, if necessary, to have the court appoint counsel if defendant cannot afford counsel at every other stage of the proceedings.)
- d) The right to be presumed innocent and to have the burden of proof placed on the government to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
- e) The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against defendant.
- f) The right, if defendant wished, to testify on defendant's own behalf and present evidence in opposition to the charges, including the right to call witnesses and to subpoena those witnesses to testify.
- g) The right not to be compelled to testify, and, if defendant chose not to testify or present evidence, to have that choice not be used against defendant.

By pleading guilty, defendant also gives up any and all rights to pursue any affirmative defenses, Fourth Amendment or Fifth Amendment claims, and other pretrial motions that have been filed or could be filed.

SENTENCING FACTORS

- higher court that constitutional considerations render them inapplicable, the Court is required to consider and apply the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G." or "Sentencing Guidelines") but may depart from those guidelines under some circumstances. Defendant understands that, should a higher court conclude that constitutional considerations render the Sentencing Guidelines inapplicable, the Court may be free to exercise its discretion to impose any sentence up to the maximum set by statute for the crimes of conviction.
- 13. Defendant and the USAO agree and stipulate to the following applicable sentencing guideline factors:

Base Offense Level: 12 [U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1(a)(2)]

Specific Offense Characteristics:

Offense committed under color of law: +6 [U.S.S.G. 2H1.1(b)(1)

Defendant and the USAO reserve the right to argue that additional specific offense characteristics, adjustments and departures are appropriate.

14. There is no agreement as to defendant's criminal history or criminal history category.

the United States Probation Office or the Court. Both defendant and the USAO are free to: (a) supplement the facts by supplying relevant information to the United States Probation Office and the Court, (b) correct any and all factual misstatements relating to the calculation of the sentence, and (c) argue on appeal and collateral review that the Court's sentencing calculations are not error, although each party agrees to maintain its view that the calculations in paragraph 13 are consistent with the facts of this case.

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16. With respect to the sentencing guideline factors stipulated to in paragraph 13, to the extent defendant has a right to have the facts used to determine the applicability of those factors charged in the information by a grand jury and found by a jury at trial beyond a reasonable doubt (see Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (June 24, 2004); United States v. <u>Ameline</u>, No. 02-30326 (9th Cir. July 21, 2004)), defendant waives those rights and agrees that the Court may, regardless of the method by which sentence is imposed, rely on these facts at sentencing as if they had been charged in the information and found by a jury at trial beyond a reasonable doubt. Both defendant and the USAO specifically reserve their rights to make any and all other arguments regarding the effect of Blakely on the application and/or constitutional validity of the sentencing guidelines, including the argument that if Blakely applies to the guidelines it renders them inapplicable and leaves the court free

to exercise its discretion to sentence bound only by the statutory maximum.

DEFENDANT'S OBLIGATIONS

- 17. Defendant agrees that he or she will:
 - a) Plead guilty as set forth in this agreement.
- b) Not knowingly and willfully fail to abide by all sentencing stipulations contained in this agreement.
- c) Not knowingly and willfully fail to: (i) appear as ordered for all court appearances, (ii) surrender as ordered for service of sentence, (iii) obey all conditions of any bond, and (iv) obey any other ongoing court order in this matter.
- d) Not commit any crime; however, offenses which would be excluded for sentencing purposes under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c) are not within the scope of this agreement.
- e) Not knowingly and willfully fail to be truthful at all times with Pretrial Services, the U.S. Probation Office, and the Court.
- f) Pay the applicable special assessment[s] at or before the time of sentencing unless defendant lacks the ability to pay.
- 18. Defendant further agrees to cooperate fully with the USAO, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, and, as directed by the USAO, any other federal, state, local, or foreign law enforcement agency. This cooperation requires defendant to:

- a) Respond truthfully and completely to all questions that may be put to defendant, whether in interviews, before a grand jury, or at any trial or other court proceeding.
- b) Attend all meetings, grand jury sessions, trials or other proceedings at which defendant's presence is requested by the USAO or compelled by subpoena or court order.
- c) Produce voluntarily all documents, records, or other tangible evidence relating to matters about which the USAO, or its designee, inquires.
- d) Act, if requested by the USAO to do so by the USAO, in an undercover capacity to the best of defendant's ability in connection with criminal investigations by federal, state, or local law enforcement authorities, in accordance with the instructions of those law enforcement authorities. Defendant agrees not to act undercover, tape record any conversations, or gather any evidence unless expressly instructed or authorized to do so by federal, state, or local law enforcement authorities.

THE USAO'S OBLIGATIONS

- 19. If defendant complies fully with all defendant's obligations under this agreement, the USAO agrees:
- a) To abide by all sentencing stipulations contained in this agreement.
- b) At the time of sentencing, provided that defendant demonstrates an acceptance of responsibility for the offenses up to and including the time of sentencing, to recommend a two-level reduction in the applicable sentencing guideline offense level,

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and to recommend and, if necessary, move for an additional one-level reduction if available under that section.

- Not to offer as evidence in its case-in-chief in c) the above-captioned case or any other prosecution that may be brought against defendant by the USAO, or in connection with any sentencing proceeding in any case that may be brought against defendant by the USAO, any statements made by defendant or documents, records, or tangible evidence provided by defendant pursuant to this agreement or the letter agreement previously entered into by the parties dated September 29, 2004 and signed September 30, 2004 ("the Letter Agreement"). Defendant agrees, however, that the USAO may use such statements, documents, records, and tangible evidence: (1) to obtain and pursue leads to other evidence, which evidence may be used for any purpose, including any prosecution of defendant, (2) to cross-examine defendant should defendant testify, or to rebut any evidence, argument or representations made by defendant or a witness called by defendant in any trial, sentencing hearing, or other court proceeding, and (3) in any prosecution of defendant for false statement, obstruction of justice, or perjury.
- d) Not to use any information provided by defendant pursuant to this agreement or the Letter Agreements against defendant at sentencing for the purpose of determining the applicable guideline range, including the appropriateness of an upward departure, and to recommend to the Court that such

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information not be used in determining the point in the Sentencing Guidelines range at which defendant should be sentenced. Defendant understands, however, that information provided by defendant pursuant to this agreement or the Letter Agreements will be disclosed to the probation office and the Court, and that the Court may use this information for the purposes set forth in U.S.S.G § 1B1.8(b).

- e) In connection with defendant's sentencing, to bring to the Court's attention the nature and extent of defendant's cooperation.
- f) If the USAO determines, in its exclusive judgment, that defendant has both complied with his or her obligations under paragraphs 15 and 16 above and provided substantial assistance to law enforcement in the prosecution or investigation of another ("substantial assistance"), to move the Court pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 to impose a sentence below the sentencing range otherwise dictated by the sentencing guidelines.

DEFENDANT'S UNDERSTANDINGS REGARDING SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE

- 20. Defendant understands the following:
- a) Any knowingly false or misleading statement by defendant will subject defendant to prosecution for false statement, obstruction of justice, and perjury and will constitute a breach by defendant of this agreement.
- b) Nothing in this agreement requires the USAO or any other prosecuting or law enforcement agency to accept any

cooperation or assistance that defendant may offer, or to use it in any particular way.

- c) Defendant cannot withdraw defendant's guilty plea if the USAO does not make a motion pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 for a reduced sentence or if the USAO makes such a motion and the Court does not grant it.
- d) At this time the USAO makes no agreement or representation as to whether any cooperation that defendant has provided or intends to provide constitutes substantial assistance. The decision whether defendant has provided substantial assistance rests solely within the discretion of the USAO.
- e) The USAO's determination of whether defendant has provided substantial assistance will not depend in any way on whether the government prevails at any trial or court hearing in which defendant testifies.

BREACH OF AGREEMENT

21. If defendant, at any time between the execution of this agreement and the completion of defendant's cooperation pursuant to the agreement or defendant's sentencing on a non-custodial sentence or surrender for service on a custodial sentence, whichever is later, knowingly violates or fails to perform any of defendant's obligations under this agreement ("a breach"), the USAO may declare this agreement breached. For example, if the defendant knowingly in an interview, before a grand jury, or at trial, falsely accuses another person of criminal conduct or

incrimination, or (2) any claim under the United States

Constitution, any statute, Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure, Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, or

any other federal rule, that statements, documents, records,

tangible evidence, or information provided by defendant before or

after the signing of this agreement, or any leads derived

therefrom, should be inadmissible.

- 22. Following a knowing and willful breach of this agreement by defendant, should the USAO elect to pursue any charge that was either dismissed or not filed as a result of this agreement, then:
- a) Defendant agrees that any applicable statute of limitations is tolled between the date of defendant's signing of this agreement and the commencement of any such prosecution or action.
- b) Defendant gives up all defenses based on the statute of limitations, any claim of preindictment delay, or any speedy trial claim with respect to any such prosecution, except to the extent that such defenses existed as of the date of defendant's signing of this agreement.

LIMITED MUTUAL WAIVER OF APPEAL AND COLLATERAL ATTACK

23. Defendant gives up the right to appeal any sentence imposed by the Court, including any order of restitution, and the manner in which the sentence is determined, provided that (a) the sentence is within the statutory maximum specified above and is constitutional, and (b) the Court imposes sentence by applying

the guidelines, does not depart upward in offense level or criminal history category, determines that the total offense level is 15 or below, and imposes a sentence within the range corresponding to the determined total offense level and criminal history category. Defendant also gives up any right to bring a post-conviction collateral attack on the convictions or sentence, including any order of restitution, except a post-conviction collateral attack based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a claim of newly discovered evidence, or an explicitly retroactive change in the applicable Sentencing Guidelines, sentencing statutes, or statutes of conviction. Notwithstanding the foregoing, defendant retains the ability to appeal the amount or terms of any restitution order and the court's determination of defendant's criminal history category and the conditions of supervised release imposed by the court, with the exception of the following: standard conditions set forth in any district court General Orders; the drug testing conditions mandated by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(a)(5) and 3583(d); and the alcohol and drug use conditions authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(7).

24. The USAO gives up its right to appeal the Court's Sentencing Guidelines calculations, provided that (a) the Court does not depart downward in offense level or criminal history category (except by a downward departure in offense level pursuant to, and to the extent requested by, the USAO in a motion under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1) and (b) the Court determines that the total offense level is 15 or above prior to any departure under

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one - not the prosecutor, defendant's attorney, or the Court - can make a binding prediction or promise regarding the sentence defendant will receive, except that it will be within the statutory maximum.

NO ADDITIONAL AGREEMENTS

27. Except as set forth herein, there are no promises, understandings or agreements between the USAO and defendant or defendant's counsel. This agreement supersedes and replaces the Letter Agreements. Nor may any additional agreement, understanding or condition be entered into unless in a writing signed by all parties or on the record in court.

PLEA AGREEMENT PART OF THE GUILTY PLEA HEARING

28. The parties agree and stipulate that this Agreement will be considered part of the record of defendant's guilty plea hearing as if the entire Agreement had been read into the record of the proceeding.

FACTUAL BASIS

29. Defendant and the USAO agree and stipulate to the statement of facts provided below. This statement of facts includes facts sufficient to support a plea of guilty to the charges described in this agreement and to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury the sentencing guideline factors set forth in paragraph 13 above. It is not meant to be a complete recitation of all facts relevant to the underlying criminal conduct or all facts known to defendant that relate to that conduct.

- i. Defendant got out of his vehicle and pointed his service firearm at Petri, ordering Petri to get out of Petri's car. Petri did not comply, and instead attempted to free Petri's car from its position. As Petri dislodged Petri's car, defendant was not standing in front of Petri's car, but instead was off to the left-front side of Petri's car. Defendant fired four shots at the left-front wheel well of Petri's car in an effort to prevent Petri's car from escaping. At the time defendant fired, defendant was not in fear for his life and did not perceive himself to be in imminent danger of bodily injury.
- j. Defendant caused Petri to be arrested, charged with various crimes, including attempted murder, in violation of 664/187 of the California Penal Code, and taken to jail on those charges. Defendant knew at the time that the facts of the incident did not support an attempted murder charge against Petri.
- k. Shortly after the shooting, but before FPS investigators or supervisors arrived at the scene, defendant spoke with FPS officer J.H. about the incident, and told J.H. how

they should describe the attempted stop, pursuit, shooting, and arrest.

- 1. When FPS Special Agent C.J. arrived to investigate the supposed assault by Petri on defendant, defendant falsely told Special Agent C.J. that he saw Petri's car drive slowly past the Federal Building immediately before defendant began pursuing Petri. Defendant also falsely claimed that Petri's car had engaged in suspicious behavior prior to, and during the pursuit. Defendant made these untrue statements because defendant knew he needed a connection to federal property in order to have FPS jurisdiction.
- m. Defendant also falsely told Special Agent C.J. that at the time shots were fired, he was in fear for his life and shot at Petri in self-defense.
- n. Later that same day, defendant repeated the false statements described in paragraphs 1 and m, again telling FPS Special Agents C.J. and D.S. that he saw Petri's car drive slowly past the Federal Building immediately prior to defendant initiating defendant's pursuit of Petri's car, and that he fired his weapon in self-defense, while in fear for his life.

 Defendant knew these statements were false. Defendant also knew that the statements were used to complete a criminal complaint and affidavit, and to charge Petri with a federal crime, that is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(b), Assaulting, Resisting, or Impeding Certain Officers or Employees (Using a Deadly Weapon).

 Defendant knew the true facts did not support such a charge.

- p. On or about February 18, 2003, defendant and FPS officer J.H. were present and remained silent at Petri's court appearance at which a United States Magistrate Judge ordered Petri to be detained. Defendant knew that the false statements concerning where the incident began and the justification for firing his weapon were repeated to the Magistrate Judge during this hearing.
- q. On or about February 18, 2003, defendant told
 Assistant United States Attorney S.K. that on or about February
 15, 2003 he had seen Petri's car drive slowly past the federal
 building immediately prior to defendant's pursuit of Petri's car,
 and that he fired shots in self-defense, while in fear for his
 life. Defendant knew these statements were false. FPS Officer
 J.H. was present when defendant told Assistant United States
 Attorney S.K. these false statements. J.H. said nothing that
 contradicted defendant.
- r. On or about February 20, 2003, defendant told FPS Special Agent D.S. that on or about February 15, 2003 he had seen

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Petri's car drive slowly past the federal building immediately prior to defendant's pursuit of Petri's car, and that he fired shots in self-defense, while in fear for his life. Defendant knew these statements were false.

This agreement is effective upon signature by defendant, an Assistant United States Attorney, and an attorney of the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division.

AGREED AND ACCEPTED

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEBRA W. YANG United States Attorney

10/19/2004

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION

Assistant United States Attorney

R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA Assistant Attorney General

Trial Attorney

JERROB DUFFY Date

I have read this agreement and carefully discussed every part of it with my attorney. I understand the terms of this agreement, and I voluntarily agree to those terms. My attorney has advised me of my rights, of possible defenses, of the Sentencing Guideline provisions, and of the consequences of entering into this agreement. No promises or inducements have

Petri's car drive slowly past the federal building immediately prior to defendant's pursuit of Petri's car, and that he fired shots in self-defense, while in fear for his life. Defendant knew these statements were false.

This agreement is effective upon signature by defendant, an Assistant United States Attorney, and an attorney of the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division.

AGREED AND ACCEPTED

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEBRA W. YANG United States Attorney

DAVID P. VAUGHN Assistant United States Attorney Date

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION

R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA

Assistant Attorney General

JERROB DUFFY Trial Attorney Date

I have read this agreement and carefully discussed every part of it with my attorney. I understand the terms of this agreement, and I voluntarily agree to those terms. My attorney has advised me of my rights, of possible defenses, of the Sentencing Guideline provisions, and of the consequences of entering into this agreement. No promises or inducements have

been made to me other than those contained in this agreement. one has threatened or forced me in any way to enter into this agreement. Finally, I am satisfied with the representation of my 3 attorney in this matter. 5 6 7 PETER TAOY 8 Defendant I am PETER TAOY's attorney. I have carefully discussed 9 10 11 12 13 14 voluntary one. 15 16 17 FRANK BELL Counsel for Defendant 18 PETER TAOY 19 20

<u>/0//9/04</u> Date

every part of this agreement with my client. Further, I have fully advised my client of his/her rights, of possible defenses, of the Sentencing Guidelines' provisions, and of the consequences of entering into this agreement. To my knowledge, my client's declision to enter into this agreement is an informed and

10/19/09 Date

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